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LIST OF PARTIES 
Carlos Vorher 
Defendant in a criminal action filed in the Tooele Valley Justice Court (now known 
as the Tooele County Justice Court) and subsequent appellant in a trial de novo in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Tooele County. Petitioner for a writ of mandamus in the Utah 
Court of Appeals and Appellant on writ of certiorari here. 
Honorable Stephen Henriod 
Respondent in the Utah Court of Appeals and Appellee in this Court. Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, who presided over Mr. Vorher's trial de 
novo. 
Tooele City Corporation 
Party in interest. Agency prosecuting Mr. Vorher. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78A-3-102(3) and (5) (2011 Supp.), this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Utah Court of Appeals, which the Court exercises 
in its sole discretion by granting writs of certiorari. The Court granted a writ of certiorari in 
this case on November 15, 2011. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 f2008) 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense 
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than 
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known 
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court 
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the 
basis for the increased sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and 
later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which 
case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position 
as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never 
occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. S78A-7-118(1) and (2) (2011 Supp.) 
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the 
district court only if the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30 
days of: 
1 
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(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the 
justice court resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt; or 
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in abeyance. 
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered pursuant to 
negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not reserve the 
right to appeal as part of the plea negotiation, the negotiation is voided 
by the appeal. 
Rule 38(e)(3) and (e)(4\ Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(e) District court procedures for trials de novo. An appeal by a defendant 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-l 18(1) shall be accomplished by 
the following procedures: 
* * * 
(e)(3) After the trial, the district court shall, if appropriate, sentence 
the defendant and enter judgment in the case as provided in 
these rules and otherwise by law. 
(e)(4) When entered, the judgment of conviction or order of dismissal 
serves to vacate the judgment or orders of the justice court and 
becomes the judgment of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tooele City Corporation concurs with Mr. Vorher5 s statement of the case with the 
exception of one of his stated facts. The calculation of the amount of time Vorher was 
incarcerated prior to being released by order of the Utah Court of Appeals appears to be in 
error. Using Mr. Vorher5s stated dates, the City calculates his total incarceration to be no 
more than lOldays. 
2 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Carlos Vorher (hereafter referred to as "Vorher") argues that under the 
terms of North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,23 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1969) and 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(1) (2008), he is not subject to the greater sentence imposed by 
Judge Henriod after a trial de novo. However, Vorher gives no justification why he is not 
subject to the exception of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). Indeed, there is no basis 
in the United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution, Utah statute, Utah case law, or 
public policy exempting Vorher from the application of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b) 
(2008). 
In Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), this Court, citing 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1953) and North Carolina v. Pearce^t/pra, held that after a trial 
de novo, a district court could not sentence two justice court appellants more harshly than the 
sentences given them in the justice court. While Wisden remains the general rule in regard 
to defendants who have appealed their justice court convictions, Wisden does not control this 
case where, pursuant to a plea agreement, Vorher pled guilty to a reduced charge of 
disorderly conduct in the justice court, later repudiated his agreement by appeal to the district 
court, and after jury conviction received a sentence commensurate with the more serious 
crime of voyeurism. 
Although the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 
3 
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appeared to announce a broad principle that a defendant never could be sentenced more 
harshly after a successful criminal appeal, the court substantially narrowed this principle in 
subsequent cases. Significantly, in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 
L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the court observed that North Carolina v. Pearce had been held not to 
apply to two-tiered justice court appeal systems or to cases involving negotiated pleas. Since 
both of these circumstances were central to this case, there was no United States 
constitutional impediment to the increased sentence Judge Henriod gave to Vorher. 
In State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 99 P.3d 858, this Court noted the evolution of the 
United States Supreme Court analysis and held that federal due process and Utah Code §76-
3-405 protected due process under the Utah Constitution. In Samora, the Court quoted 
section 76-3-405 verbatim, including the exception to the harsher sentence principle. 
Accordingly, the Utah Constitution did not preclude Judge Henriod from imposing the more 
severe sentence. 
The Utah Court Appeals correctly held that the exception of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
405(2)(b) (2008) applied to Vorher. However, the Court of Appeals included discussion in 
its decision indicating that (1) the language of the statute appeared not to exactly fit justice 
court appellants and that (2) Vorher and others similarly situated appeared to have lost their 
right of appeal. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' assessment, the language of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-405 (2008) expressly applies to justice court appellants when read in conjunction 
with Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-l 18(2) (2011 Supp.) and Rule 38(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
4 
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Procedure. Furthermore, when one considers the appeal options that all justice court 
defendants are given, Vorher's rights on appeal were no different than any other justice court 
appellant. 
Finally, as a matter of public policy, there is no reason why Vorher should be exempt 
from the exception of Utah Code §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). As recognized by this Court and 
the Court of Appeals, justice court appellants already enjoy greater rights on appeal than non-
justice court appellants. There is no public policy according Vorher even greater appellate 
rights. This Court, acknowledging that prosecutors and defendants enter into plea 
agreements to afford each party the benefits of reducing uncertainty and avoiding additional 
expense, has held that it would be anomalous to permit a defendant to enjoy the benefit of 
a repudiated agreement while requiring the prosecution to expend further resources 
prosecuting the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WISDEN v. DISTRICT COURT IS THE 
SEMINAL CASE ADDRESSING 
INCREASED SENTENCES AFTER JUSTICE 
COURT APPEAL. 
In Wisden v. District Court. 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), this Court held 
that Utah Code §76-3-405, the United States constitutional right to due process, and the Utah 
constitutional right to appeal applied to de novo appeals from the justice court to the district 
5 
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court. In that case, two brothers had been convicted injustice court of class B 
misdemeanors and had appealed to the district court. The district court found the brothers 
guilty after a trial de novo and sentenced them more harshly than they had been sentenced 
in the justice court. The brothers sought extraordinary relief from this Court. In ordering the 
district court judge to resentence the defendants, the Court stated: 
U.C.A., 1953, §76-3-405 provides that the sentence imposed 
after retrial shall not be more severe than the original sentence 
when the first conviction is set aside on direct or collateral 
attack. In State v. Sorensen, Utah, 639 P.2d 179 (1981), we 
interpreted this statute to mean that no new element of sentence 
can be added on retrial; that no element may be augmented and 
that the statute precludes justifying an increase in one element 
of sentence by elimination of another. As the time commitment 
in plaintiffs' sentences was increased by the district court, 
though the fines were eliminated, the district court sentences 
were contrary to section 76-3-405 and were invalid as impairing 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights to appeal. See State v. Sorensen, 
supra; Chess v. Smith. Utah, 617 P.2d 341 (1980). 
Because a justice of the peace court in this state is not a court of 
record, an appeal from that court is by way of a trial de novo in 
the district court, rather than a review of the justice's rulings. 
The district court judge, sitting as a trial judge, may have 
reasoned that section 76-3-405 did not apply, since the first 
conviction was not "set aside on direct review or on collateral 
attack." 
Our rule is not confined to the statutory limitation, however. In 
State v. Sorensen, supra, this Court followed due process 
requirements enunciated in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), in ruling that a 
defendant should be freed of the apprehension of a more severe 
sentence as a retaliation for exercising his right of appeal. In 
Chess v. Smith, supra, we held that a person's decision to avail 
himself of the right to appeal guaranteed under art. VIII, sec. 9 
6 
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of the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by making it 
conditional on taking the risk of a harsher sentence after the 
second trial. Plaintiffs are guaranteed the right to appeal from 
the justice court to the district court pursuant to art. VIII, sec. 9 
of the Utah Constitution. They should not be required to take the 
risk of a longer jail sentence in order to exercise that right. 
Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606. While Wisden stated the law as it existed at the time the Court 
rendered its decision, subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions and consequent 
amendment to the Utah Code led to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in this case. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WAS 
CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the 
principal case this Court cited in Wisden, supra, the defendant had successfully appealed his 
conviction, had been retried, again had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to a term 
that in combination with the time he had previously served exceeded the sentence initially 
given him. The United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution precluded a sentencing judge from imposing a more severe penalty in 
retaliation against the defendant for having exercised the defendant's right to appeal: 
i 
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a 
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction 
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. 
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally 
deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally 
7 
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attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a 
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory 
motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of Pearce, exempting de novo trial appellate systems and cases involving 
negotiated pleas. 
In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the 
defendant had negotiated a plea bargain whereby the prosecution had agreed to drop one of 
the charges in return for guilty pleas to the remainder of the charges. The trial court 
sentenced the defendant to a term of thirty years in prison. The defendant successfully 
appealed his conviction, then was tried and convicted on all charges, and was given a much 
longer prison term. The United States Supreme Court upheld the sentence, stating: 
While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule 
of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear 
that its presumption of vindictiveness "do[es] not apply in every 
case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on 
retrial." Texas v. McCullough, supra, at 138. As we explained 
in Texas v. McCullough, "the evil the [Pearce] Court sought to 
prevent" was not the imposition of "enlarged sentences after a 
new trial," but "vindictiveness of a sentencing judge." Ibid. See 
also Chaffin v. Stvnchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (the 
Pearce presumption was not designed to prevent the imposition 
of an increased sentence on retrial "for some valid reason 
associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the 
sentencing process," but was "premised on the apparent need to 
guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process"). 
Because the Pearce presumption "may operate in the 
absence of any proof of an improper motive, and thus . . . 
block a legitimate response to criminal conduct," United 
States v, Goodwin, supra at 373, we have limited its 
8 
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application, like that of "other 'judicially created means of 
effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution]/" to 
circumstances "where its 'objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served/" Texas v. McCullougbu supra, at 138 
quoting Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465,482, 487 (1976). Such 
circumstances are those in which there is a "reasonable 
likelihood," United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 373, that the 
increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on 
the part of the sentencing authority. Where there is no such 
reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to 
prove actual vindictiveness, see Wasman v. United States, 468 
U.S. 559, 569(1984). 
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), for example, we 
refused to apply the presumption when the increased 
sentence was imposed by the second court in a two-tier 
system which gave a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor 
in an inferior court the right to trial de novo in a superior 
court. We observed that the trial de novo represented a 
"completely fresh determination of guilt or innocence" by a 
court that was not being "asked to do over what it thought 
it had already done correctly." Id. at 117. If the de novo trial 
resulted in a greater penalty, we said that "it no more follows 
that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty . . . than that the 
inferior court imposed a lenient penalty." Ibid. Consequently, 
we rejected the proposition that greater penalties on retrial 
were explained by vindictiveness "with sufficient frequency 
to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule." Id. at 116. 
Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stvnchcombe. 412 U.S. 17 (1973), we 
held that no presumption of vindictiveness arose when a second 
jury, on retrial following a successful appeal, imposed a higher 
sentence than a prior jury. We thought that a second jury was 
unlikely to have a "personal stake" in the prior conviction or to 
be "sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion 
higher sentences." Id- at 26-28. 
We think the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that, 
when a greater penalty is imposed after trial than was 
imposed after a prior guilty plea, the increase in sentence is 
not more likely than not attributable to the vindictiveness on 
9 
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the part of the sentencing judge. Even when the same judge 
imposes both sentences, the relevant sentencing information 
available to the judge after the plea will usually be 
considerably less than that available after a trial. A guilty 
plea must be both "voluntary" and "intelligent," Bovkin v. 
Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), because it "is the 
defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts 
charged in the indictment," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742,748 (1970). But the sort of information which satisfies this 
requirement will usually be far less than that brought out in a 
full trial on the merits. 
As this case demonstrates, supra, at 796-797, in the course of the 
proof at trial, the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the 
nature and extent of the crimes charged. The defendant's 
conduct during trial may give the judge insights into his moral 
character and suitability for rehabilitation. Supra, at 797. See 
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53 (1978) (sentencing 
authority's perception of the truthfulness of a defendant 
testifying on his own behalf may be considered in sentencing). 
Finally, after trial, the factors that may have indicated leniency 
as consideration for the guilty plea are no longer present. See 
Brady v. United States, supra, at 752. 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-801, 109 S.Ct. at 2204-2206. [Emphasis added]. 
To summarize, federal due process does not require a presumption of vindictiveness (1) 
where greater penalties are imposed in two-tiered de novo trial appellate systems or (2) in 
circumstances where a defendant initially pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and a 
sentencing judge had more information after hearing evidence at trial. Both of these 
circumstances apply to Vorher. 
10 
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POINT III 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND UTAH 
CODE §76-3-405 PRESERVE THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF A 
RIGHT OF APPEAL. 
In Wisden, supra, at 606, this Court cited Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) 
for the broad proposition that under the terms of the state constitution a person's right to 
appeal could not be impaired by the risk of receiving a harsher sentence after a second trial. 
Subsequently, after reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent, this Court refined its 
analysis and stated that the state constitutional guarantee of the right of appeal is preserved 
by federal due process and Utah Code §76-3-405. 
The Court summarized the applicable concepts in State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 
ffl 15-17, 99 P.3d 858: 
We have long held that when a defendant successfully has his 
conviction or sentence set aside on appeal, the court generally 
cannot impose a harsher sentence on resentencing. Both federal 
due process and Utah statutory provisions protect against the 
imposition of a harsher sentence. See, e.g.. North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969); State v. 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-81 (Utah 1981); Chess v. Smith, 
617 P.2d 341, 343 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (2003). 
The United States Supreme Court first explained this principle 
in Pearce, where it held that, while harsher sentences are not 
absolutely prohibited by the constitution, due process "requires 
that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he 
receives after a new trial." 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct 2072. The 
Court concluded that: 
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence 
11 
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upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for 
his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those 
reasons must be based upon objective information 
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the 
defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding. 
Id. ai .-o, 8*- ^ .<' '2. see also Sorenscn, 639 P M a' 12f\ 
The Pearce Co mi reasoned that these protections are particularly 
necessary in ,»rdei to ensure that there :s J.O chilling ,>f a 
defendant's tor- M^.-init- »vi'M.|iiT..,:irP!.:l| =Q5U.s. a* "?4, 
89 S.Ct. 2072. 
In subsequent eases,, the Supreme Cuuri 1:.;.- DL,:.U caivlul. not to 
construe Pearce too broadi), stating that the Pearce presumption 
~*
r
 vmdictiveness "do[es] not apply in every ease where a 
dieted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial." 
.as v. McCullough. 475 U.S. 134, 138, 106 S.Ct 976, 89 
d.2d 104 (1986). The Court has "restricted application of 
iiee to areas where its objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served." Id. (internal quotations omitted). For 
example, the "presumption of Pearce cioes: n>i a:>pi\ in situations 
where the possibility of ' \ "ndicliveness i- -\e-"\ ; speculative, 
particularly since Lhe presumption :,.'_v \c peraie in the 
nee of any nronfoi an improper motn r and itius , block 
a legitimate response to criminal conduct d w ^ )6 Q Ct. 
976 (internal quotations omitted) 
Hi (idditiwn ' v JL-_
 r-;. u'.:.S;-. p : . lecl:,*hb, ,;;^ 
Legislature ha* enacted Utah Code section 7&-3-4U5, wnich 
states as follows: 
I 1  I Where a conviction, or sentence has been set 
aside on direct review" or on collateral attack, the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for the 
same offense or for a different offense based on 
the same conduct which is more severe than the 
prior sentence less the portion of the prior 
lenience previously satisfied. 
12 
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(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts 
which were not known to the court at the time of 
the original sentence, and the court affirmatively 
places on the record the facts which provide the 
basis for the increased sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with 
the prosecution and later successfully moves to 
invalidate his conviction, in which case the 
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same 
position as though the plea bargain, conviction, 
and sentence had never occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (2003). Like the due process 
protections described in Pearce, this statutory provision 
"prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal [as 
contained in article VIII, section 9] from being impaired by 
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his 
conviction [or sentence] the risk that he may be penalized 
with a harsher sentence for having done so." Sorensen, 639 
P.2d at 180 (internal quotations omitted); see also Chess, 617 
P.2d at 343. 
[Emphasis added.] In view of this Court's statement that federal due process and Utah Code 
§76-3-405 preserve the Utah Constitution's guarantee of the right to appeal, the Court of 
Appeals decision in this case did not contravene the Utah Constitution, because the Court of 
Appeals properly applied Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (2008) to this case. 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T H I S < U U U K I nA^iini^ii IJHLAI A J U M I L E 
COURT APPEAL IS BEST VIEWED AS 
ANALOGOUS TO AN APPEAL FROM A 
DISTRICT COURT TO AN APPELLATE 
COURT, EVEN THOUGH THE FORM OF 
THE APPEAL IS BY TRIAL DE NO^ m 
justice court appellate process and the approach to be utilized when analy-'irs appellate 
issues as follows: 
Justice courts are courts "not of record, authorized by article 
VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution and governed by the 
Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78o-101 to -140 (2002). 
Justice courts are created by municipalities or counties, id. §78-
5-101.5 , and have jurisdiction over certain small claims cases, 
"class B and C misdemeanors, violate >i aduvinces and 
infractions committed within [the justke courts ^ ;err . >nal 
jurisdiction, except those offenses o\ er u • H h i, juvenile court 
has exclusive jurisdiction,," id §78-5- .1 i 
Because justice courts are cour ts not of recor d, the appeals 
process from a justice court decision is unique. A defendant who 
has pleaded guilty or been convicted injustice court is entitled 
to a trial de novo in a district court, provided that he or she files 
a noikc o( apr- -n thirtx da\ ^ o\ -he semence or guilty 
plea Id. §7X- :.v-M ! K 
convicted in a Utah justkt ,oun exercisi - m* n-- he; right to a 
trial Je ;K>\ o. ihe justice court s\ stem >triu. i ur\s the dc novo trial 
itself as an appellate review of die onv aio< alKit i- inal 
f^r\ti instead -.-? a more traditional 4 »n* •** yrd;;*u- re iew. 
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Thus, a defendant stands in a position similar to a district court 
defendant appealing his or her conviction before either this court 
or the court of appeals. And where j eopardy has attached in the 
justice court proceeding and remains attached without 
termination during the trial de novo, continuing jeopardy allows 
for a defendant-initiated appellate review in the form of a de 
novo trial without implicating double jeopardy concerns. Cf. 
Lydon, 466 U.S. at 308-09, 104 S.Ct. 1805. 
Utah's system is best viewed as placing defendants in the same 
position as district court defendants appealing their sentence in 
the first instance for several reasons. First, Utah's system is 
structured to allow district courts to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction. Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
clearly states that district courts "shall have appellate 
jurisdiction as provided by statute." Utah Const, art. VIII, §5 
(emphasis added). Consistent with this authority, the Utah 
Legislature has provided that district courts "ha[ve] appellate 
jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the judgments of the 
justice court." Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(5) (2002) (emphasis 
added). In light of this framework, we have previously held that 
in Utah, a trial de novo in district court satisfies the right to 
appeal from a justice court. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
Since Vorher's appeal to the district court was a direct appeal, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 
(2008) applied to Vorher, and the Court of Appeals reached the correct result. 
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POIJS 
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT WAS 
ACTING IN A TRUE APPELLATE ROLE, 
THE TERMS OF UTAH CODE §76-3-405, 
INCLUDING I HE EXCEPTION OF 
SUBPARAGRAPH (2) ( b), EXPRESSLY 
APPLIED TO MR. VORHER. 
A. The Court of Appeals Reached the Appropriate Result But Some of the Court's 
Comments Require Modification. 
The Court of Appeals properly held that Utah Code Ann. ^ 6 - M0S(? |(h! l '"'KIKl 
applied to Vorhcr and sustained the district court's sent/Met Vorher v. Henriod, 2011 UT 
Ap|J IIW, V *» . •. •. : Knvevr *vHc *he C~ort ~f \ppcals reached the correct 
rcsuili, mil ill ' v , ..-ic.-: accord with tins 
Court's prior caseb and statutory :anL»ua •., ^ ' is : 
We recognize :-. »^  a >;nu -uis^. Vorhcr and others vho 
vacate their plea agreements injustice con- I in wiuoMing ,; ".rial 
de nn\ o in district court do not "stand in he a- ic positi i as 
though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never 
occurred," see id,, because they have lost the right to appellate 
review. See id. §78A-7-l 18(8) (Supp. 2010) ("The decision of 
the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the 
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance.") However, we are not convinced that the legislature 
intended to exclude justia. inun pica agiwincib; from section 
76-3-405(2)(b)'s exception to the general i =;ie against increased 
punishment following appeals Rather, ,• appears that section 
76-3-405 was intended to c«»\er all crinrnal appeals but was 
drafted without specific consideration of lie practical 
differences between, p1-'* -;*rt -ippe-- v ' ^ r,":,,t ^irt 
U U U V U I L ) . 
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The Utah Supreme Court has applied section 76-3-405 to justice 
court appeals even though the statutory language is in some 
ways inconsistent with the justice court appeal process. See 
Wisden v. District Court 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam) (applying section 76-3-405(1) to a trial de novo 
following an appeal from the justice court, despite the statute's 
language limiting its application to situations where a conviction 
was set aside on direct review or on collateral attack). Compare 
State v. Powell 957 P.2d 595,596-97 (Utah 1998) (holding that 
the successful withdrawal of a guilty plea, even after appeal, 
does not constitute the setting aside of a conviction on direct 
review or collateral attack). 
Vorher, 211 UT 199 , Tfl2 and fn. 4, 262 P.3d 42. Contrary to the Court of Appeals5 
statements, the Bernat analysis and the rules of criminal procedure demonstrate that the 
language of section 76-3-405 specifically applies both to traditional and to justice court 
appeals. Furthermore, Vorher and others in his position have not been denied their right to 
appeal. 
B. The Language of Section 76-3-405(1) Applies to Justice Court Appeals. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(1) (2008) reads as follows: 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct 
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new 
sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on 
the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence 
less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied. 
The introductory phrase of this section includes two concepts - direct review and setting 
aside a conviction or sentence. These concepts specifically apply to justice court appeals. 
(1) Direct Review. 
In Bernat supra, this Court unequivocally stated that an appeal from a justice court 
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to th. di^tnt.. C»MII. i.> analogous to an appeal from a district court to a traditional appellate 
n o t diminish in an,) r respect the fact that the district court lunetioii'i a • thr <1M <V< n " "en 
authority for justice court; appeals, 
(2) Setting Aside Conviction or Sentence 
h " • e . . _i:,:.. ;>j-.ak ,0 the issue of setting aside a. 
conviction or >, "I.*" x applicab 
(c; Pisimi f<u. ; ^'rurednrcs '>ir 'i-ak de 
\\* an x:al h\ ;i dcfendani
 (-Tsuant 
;** i tiilu oil '• ir. ":K N ' X( i »^ hal he 
accomplished by the following procedures: 
(e)(3 Aitci UK mai, UK -H . 
shall, if appropriate -.n.e'ice ihe 
defendant and enter judgment in the 
case a> provided in ihese rules and 
otherwise by law. 
(e)(4) W hen entered, the judgment of 
conviction or order of dismissal 
serves to vacate the judgment or 
orders of the justice court and 
becomes the judgment of the case. 
i..i -Xie) dictates that the district court judgment, when entered, serves to vacate the 
coin I ill in1, selling aside the conviction or sentence" as provided in 
Utah Code §76- \ 4IIS; | ) | h ihv II.) ih express terms, su I'IOII "'ir \ Hh| I i apphe% In \u Jliu* 
court a|)peals. 
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C. The Statutory Exception Specifically Applies to Justice Court Appeals. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2) (2008) reads as follows: 
(2) This section [i.e. §76-3-405(1)] does not apply when: 
* * * 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with 
the prosecution and later successfully moves to 
invalidate his conviction, in which case the 
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same 
position as though the plea bargain, conviction, 
and sentence had never occurred. 
This subparagraph lists two conditions and a consequence if the conditions are met. The first 
condition is a negotiated plea, and the second condition is a successful move to invalidate the 
conviction. Once the conditions are fulfilled, the statute states the relationship between the 
parties. 
It is undisputed that Vorher and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement. The 
remaining question is whether Vorher "successfully mov[ed] to invalidate his conviction." 
(1) Successful invalidation of conviction. 
Pursuant to his plea agreement, Vorher pled guilty to disorderly conduct, a class C 
misdemeanor, in the justice court. When he filed his appeal, Vorher unalterably set in motion 
the successful invalidation of his conviction, i.e. Vorher precluded himself from ever being 
subject to a conviction for disorderly conduct in a trial de novo. 
Utah Code Ann.§78A-7-l 18(2) (2011 Supp.) addresses the circumstance where a 
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defendant appeals a conviction arising ft om a negotiated plea in the justice court; 
If an appeal under Subseuiwi. M . .> -I a pica entered pursuant 
to negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not 
reserve the right to appeal as part, of the plea negotiation, the 
negotiation is voided by the appeal. 
Vorher does not claim,, that as part of his negotiated plea he reserved a right U appe.i- the 
disoi derly coiuhu'l coin, ulmn I k ackno^ v v ledges that the trial de novo proeu Jo, * -.- WK) 
the only possible outcomes of the trial de novo were a guilty or a not gi lilty verdict to the 
voyeurism c1":•":.: °>v appealing and voiding his plea agreement, Vorher "successfully 
move[u ,. ..w .11. , . . v i vii-wivuny .WJK: «,,. .i-vc he could never ultimately 
b . I • - • 
(2) Standing in the same position as though the 
plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had 
never occurred. 
I he ("outl oJ Appeals appeared to interpret the phrase, "the defendant and the 
had never occurred," as though the conviction for disorderly condi ict and the resi iking 
sentence had. never occurred, I lence., the court apparently concluded that in some manner 
Vorher had lost his right to appeal. 
Neither I Hull i "ink" Ann ft7fK?...JiH(:M(|.| (.'OONi mn ;WK;V Ml INu!) (J Il I Supp I 
voided the conviction entered and the sentence pronounced a;>niii ,1 VuiU'i m Ihv m ho 
court: As discussed in Point V(B)(2) above, the entry of the district court ji ldgment after trial 
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de novo vacated the justice court judgement pursuant to Rule 38(e)(4), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Sections 76-3-405(2)(b) and 78A-7-118(2) address the relationship between Vorher 
and the prosecution after Vorher appealed. Pursuant to §78A-7-l 18(2), the appeal voided 
the negotiation. After Vorher successfully invalidated his conviction for disorderly conduct, 
both Vorher and the prosecution stood "in the same position as though the plea bargain, 
conviction, and sentence had never occurred." In other words, after appeal neither party was 
bound by the duties nor stood to benefit from the negotiated agreement. 
D. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' Conclusion, Vorher Did Not Lose Any Right to 
Appeal and Stands in a Position No Different than Any Other Justice Court Appellant. 
A defendant in the justice court has four options. Under Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-
118(1) (2011 Supp.), a defendant can try the original charge and appeal a conviction to the 
district court, or the defendant can plead guilty to the original charge in the justice court and 
appeal to the district court. As third or fourth options, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-
118(2) (2011 Supp.), the defendant can plead to a lesser charge in the justice court and have 
a trial de novo on the lesser charge, if that right has been preserved in the plea negotiation, 
or do what Vorher did - plead guilty to a lesser charge and have a trial on the original charge 
in the district court. No matter what option a defendant chooses, the defendant convicted in 
the justice court has a right to appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. If convicted in 
the trial de novo, the defendant has no further right to appeal unless the district court has 
ruled on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance under Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-118(8) 
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(2011 Supp.) I his Court previously upheld the constitutionality of this appeal process in City 
ol Monticellu v. Uinstcnsen. 78S P 2d S I \ n (11;ih i^itl) See also. Bcrnatv. Allplun., ,!()(!> 
UT1, ][25, 106 P.3d 707. Accordingly, Vorher did not lose any -L'ht •" irociiaic n. • c 
accorded others in the justice court system. 
PUBLICruLic* SUPFOK is 111¥ ^ ]in>n r 
OF APPEALS DECISION 
A. The Utah Courts Have Recognized that Justice Court Appellants Already Receive 
More Appellate Process than Non-Justice Court Appellants. 
i,;e ^ ^an 'ii.icu ^ n t sup^rr th.°t two-tiered justice cor/t systems gi \ ire a 
Lv\j justice court deieiHlani -N iiiiisinhiui i uii-n iua .k-lci law. 
appealing from a district court conviction in the firs! msneice. 
When viewed l?vi.: this . -ifa' pe^peri c, ,; |u-;;cc ,jurt 
defendant is, ifan> thing, treated more fav;*;abl\ than :->nn arly 
situated district court defendant. • :nhke defendants appealing 
from a district court, conviction, a defendant convicted injustice 
court is afforded a second opportunity to rchtigate the ucis 
relating to his or her guilt or innocence alter having ha-! the 
advantage of learning about the prosecuf''"1^ —v •••r,T» •!•• 
first trial. 
Bernat v. Allphir. 2005 T — r ;- - v ^ ni "I1" ;hL •_ tah L\JLL-_ of Appeals also 
acknowledged \n\s .nu-ea^ in process m avlorsville City v. Adkins. 20Pr TTT \ jp 374, ]f6, 
1 h IP ]ul i in-1 ,i i ust" cuing licniat, 
The nature of 1.1ah sjustkv LOLHI ^vsien w_.. uci.nou. *. ^  
defendant is convicted of a crime in ajustice court, he ir> emnled 
to atrial de \w\^ in :i di^ru i .ouii. See id. § 7 8 - > I 2 J V 1 ; . J i ^ 
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trial de novo is the constitutional equivalent of a district court 
defendant's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court or this court. See 
Bernat v. Allphin. 2005 UT 1, |25, 106 P.3d 707 ("Utah's 
system is best viewed as placing defendants in the same position 
as district court defendants appealing their sentence in the first 
instance ...."). In fact, "a justice court defendant is, if 
anything, treated more favorably than a similarly situated 
district court defendant." Id. at f 41. This is because not 
only is a justice court defendant afforded the right to 
appellate review of legal conclusions, but also a new 
opportunity to have a trier of fact review the case unfettered 
by prior factual findings. See id. Further, he is able to 
obtain this review without the requirement that he allege 
any error in the justice court proceedings. See Utah Code 
Ann. §78-05-120. 
[Emphasis added.] The courts in Bernat and Adkins agreed that the additional process given 
justice court defendants derives from the nature of the trial de novo appeal itself. 
In this case, Vorher was afforded the opportunity of two trials on the original charge, but he 
exercised his choice to plead guilty to a lesser charge and to forego the first trial. Now, 
having made his choice, he seeks an additional right that non-justice court appellants do not 
have - an exemption from the application of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). 
Vorher has not stated any legal basis or public policy supporting a further extension of justice 
court appellate rights. Indeed, as previously expressed by this Court, public policy militates 
against Vorher's request. 
B. This Court Has Stated Public Policy in Regard to Defendants Who Have Rejected 
Their Plea Agreements and Later Sought the Benefit of the Voided Bargains. 
In State v. Powell. 957 P.2d 595 (Utah 1998) and State v. Maguire. 957 P.2d 598 
(Utah 1998), this Court considered cases where, through plea negotiations, the defendants 
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Lull pleaded gutlh, had been sentenced and then had attempted ,< v\ ncii*.- acr guilty 
courts were reversed on appeal. After the defendants withdrew their guilty pleas in the trial 
court, one of the defendants again eom.proui.ised with the prosecution and pled guilty A jury 
foui 1,(1 the second defendant guilty at trial. Both delcndants were given, sentences m..ore 
to their original sentences pursuant to Utah Code §76-3-405, which at the time: the said, noes 
were imposed had M,>[ \et been amend A; to address the inapplicability of the statute to 
sentences pronouncec u>k; » ^ud^d inca agreements. After holding that the language n r pf-
: uhe increases, sentences, 
stating: 
We also believe that it would be unw ise to hold that a sentence 
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement s*- uld hmii a sentence 
subsequently imposed at trial afu r dctendam h i.- A iihdrawn his 
plea. Plea bargains are entered into so that both Mdes may avoid 
the expense and uncertaint\ of a tria! h exchange for 
conserving State resources, defendant usuali\ ;eceives a lower 
charge or lesser sentence. Thus, it would be anomalous to allow 
a defendant to keep the benein >t an agreement he repudiated 
while requiring the State U proceed to trial and prove its case. 
Povxell. •: • l-/T This public policy has eve vrv force m \ ih-j "t has been 
cod" •• • >• 1 40S( M(bi iiJMJOX) •. _. !ipp.) 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' holding that Utah Code A^r ;: v . i- iii^i: b)' 1008) applies 
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to justice court appellants is consistent with the United States Constitution, the Utah 
Constitution, Utah statute, and prior decisions of this Court. Accordingly, Tooele City 
respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision, even if the 
Court finds it necessary to clarify the Court of Appeals' analysis or language. 
Dated this 3 / day of May, 2012. 
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorney for Tooele City Corporation 
^ 
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